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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE CF UTAH 
NED O. GREGERSON and DIXIE ) 
GREGERSON, his wife, 
) 
Plaintiffs and case No. 
Appellants, ) 
vs. ) 





BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
JAMES L. JENSEN and EDRA JENSEN 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
18354 
1. May an unsigned undelivered deed which was not 
prepared by vendor nor any agent thereof be used to 
supplement an endorsed check with the notation 11 1/2 pay-
ment on land as agreed, other 1/2 payment upon delivery 
of the deed", to satisfy the statute of Frauds. 
2. Does partial payment constitute sufficient part 
performance to entitle vendee to specific performance of 
an alleged real estate sale. 
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3. rs appellants claim barred for failing to 
discharge his duty under the doctrine of inquiry notice. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
rn the latter part of September of 1971 the Appellant 
herein Ned Gregerson met with Respondent herein James Jensen 
at a service station located in Gunnison, Utah, which Jensen 
managed. Appellant was desirous of purchasing a piece of 
property owned by Respondent James Jensen in Gunnison (Tl-11, 12). 
After this initial conversation the parties, along with 
Appellant's father, went to the property in question. The 
Property Appellant sought to purchase was part of the lot 
upon which Respondent had his home and also bordered the 
community hospital. While on the property Respondent James 
Jensen indicated that he needed to retain a certain amount 
of the property for his cesspool and drain fields. Jensen 
indicated approximately how much of the property he would be 
willing to sell by kicking the dirt and indicating that from 
that point to the property line he would consider selling 
(Tl-14, T2-23) • 
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Appellant indicated to Respondent that he was desirous 
of building a dental clinic on the property once he was 
released from military service (Tl-13). He also indicated 
to Respondent that he was going to establish an Amway business 
in which Respondent could participate (T2-21). Respondent 
indicated to Appellant that he would need to obtain a partial 
release of his mortgage on the property (Tl-12). 
The parties agreed on a price of $700.00 and on the 
following day Appellant tendered a check to Respondent 
James Jensen for $350.00. The check offer as exhibit at 
trial bears the notation 11 1/2 payment on land as agreed, 
other 1/2 payment upon delivery of deed" (Tl-17). Appellant 
obtained a tax notice from Respondent Edra Jensen which 
contained a description of the entire parcel owned by 
Respondents (Tl-15). Mrs. Jensen at no time participated 
in the negotiations (T2-26, 2741). Appellant along with 
two others went to the property in question and measured it 
to ascertain if it would be large enough for his needs and 
to check the accuracy of the description in the tax notice 
(Tl-13, 31). 
Appellant then returned to Texas and had no further 
contact with Respondent except upon two occasions when he 
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returned to Gunnison for brief visits. At these times 
Respondent indicated to Appellant that he would need to 
come by and finish their transaction, which Appellant 
never did. Appellant also had changed his mind regarding 
the building of a dental clinic and establishing his business 
in Gunnison (T2-21, 22). 
Sometime after Appellant's initial departure a warranty 
deed prepared by some third party, and according to 
Respondent's testimony was deli~rered to him by Appellanes 
father, said deed listed both Respondents as granters 
although Mrs. Jensen's first name was misspelled (T2, 7, 26). 
Respondents never signed nor delivered this deed awaiting 
Appellants return to Gunnison to consummate the deal, and 
in order to check the description in the deed. (T2-9) 
Appellant brought suit against Respondents for specific 
performance, the trial court ruled against him. Appellant 
moved for a new trial upon the basis of new evidence, the 
warranty deed above mentioned, this motion was denied, Appellant 
appealed and was granted a new trial at this second trial 
judgment was entered for Respondents. And it is the review of 
this judgment that is presently before the court. 
- 4 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTY DEED WITH WHICH APPELLANT SEEKS 
TO CHARGE RESPONDENTS IS DEFECTIVE AND MAY 
NOT BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT THE ENDORSED CHECK. 
Respondents do not dispute the conclusion that two or 
more writings may be construed together as containing the 
terms of a contract for the purpose of satisfying the 
Statute of Frauds even though all are not signed by the 
party sought to be charged. Respondents do contend however 
that not any writing may be used for this purpose. The 
court has defined the conditions under which an unsigned 
writing may be used as supplement as being when there exists 
some nexus between the two either by express reference of 
inference. Admittedly the check offered by Appellant as 
exhibit refers to a deed to be delivered in the future; however, 
no specific deed is referred to, the parties could not have 
had any specific deed in mind since none existed at that 
time, the notation on the check even if binding on Respondents, 
discussed infra, refers to an event to happen in the future 
and not to a particular writing which the parties could be 
- 5 -
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seeking to incorporate therein by reference. By inference 
the notation indicates that the Respondent James Jensen was 
to prepare and deliver a deed which event never occurred~ 
therefore, said notation refers to a document which never 
existed i.e. one prepared and delivered by Jensen; therefore, 
no real nexus exists between the two documents. 
Further Respondents contend that due to the uncertain 
origin of said deed it is not of sufficient quality to be used 
as supplement. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds §§ 379, 380, 381. 
State that a party may be bound by the writing of an 
agent acting with proper authorization and that in some 
instances a party may be bound by a writing subscribed by 
the other if delivered to the party sought to be charged; 
however, the trial court ruled that neither of these instances 
occurred in this case but rather that the deed was prepared 
by a third party. How then could a document not subscribed 
by either of the parties nor any agent thereof possibly 
contain the essential terms of a contract between them? 
And how could such a document be used to satisfy the statute 
of Frauds. Even if, as testified by Respondent James Jensen, 
the deed was in some manner prepared by Appellant or someone 
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acting on his behalf, the court should not allow such a 
writing to be used to bind Respondents. The record clearly 
shows that Respondent James Jensen refused to sign and 
deliver said deed for reasons more substantial than the 
misspelling of his wife's name, in fact he testified that 
one; he was awaiting Appellants return and two; that he 
wished to have the description verified. To allow a 
document subscribed by one party to bind the other party 
when the latter clearly indicated no intent to be bound 
thereby would result in the perpetration of the fraud that 
the law seeks to prevent. 
Furthermore, some jurisdictions have held that an 
unsigned, undelivered deed may not be used to constitute 
sufficient memoranda for satisfying the Statute of Frauds, 
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds §§ 369, 377. 
POINT II 
HOLDING THAT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NOT 
BEEN SATISFIED IN THIS CASE IS NOT INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE COURT'S DECISION IN THE FIRST APPEAL. 
In that Appeal Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P. 2d 369 
(Utah 1980) the court merely held that the deed could be 
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used to supplement another writing and was sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case entitling Appellant to a new 
trial. The evidence, as discussed above, clearly shows that 
the quality of the deed as a supplemental writing is of 
uncertain origin and that no evidence supports the conclusion 
that R7spondent ever acquiesced to be bound thereby. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT BOUND BY THE NOTATION 
"1/2 PAYMENT OF LAND AS AGREED, OTHER 1/2 
PAYMENT UPON DELIVERY OF DEED" WffiCH APPEARS 
ON THE CHECK ENDORSED BY JAMES JENSEN. 
The endorsement of check on the back by the payee thereof 
does not necessarily bind him to the terms of any notation 
-on the front thereof. 2 Corbin on contracts § 520, Williston 
on contracts Third Edition § 585, Restatement 1, contracts 
§ 210 and 73 Am. Jur 2d Statute of Frauds § 362 and 360. 
State that a signature must be affixed with the intent to 
authenticate the writing. Appellant James Jensen testified 
at trial that he did not see the above-referred to notation 
on the check at the time of depositing it. To allow an 
endorser/payee of a check to be bound by a notation on a 
check without sufficient proof to establish that said 
- 8 -
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endorsement was intended as a ratification of said notation 
would allow a party to unilaterally set the conditions of a 
contract and bind the other party thereby. 
The net result of n.ot allowing the endorsed check to be 
used by Appellant as a signed document would be that there 
is not any signed memora.nda with which to satisfy the statute 
of frauds requirement. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EITHER PART 
PERFORMANCE OR SUFFICIENT MEMORANDA TO 
SATISFY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Appellant further claims that under the doctrine of 
part performance he is entitled to have the alleged oral 
contract with Respondent James Jensen specifically enforced; 
however, Appellant has failed to meet the requirements for 
specific performance under the doctrine of part performance 
in the following three (3) ways. 
1. The doctrine of part performance was fashioned 
so as to prevent the statute of frauds from being used by 
a vendor to perpetrate a fraud on a vendee, Coleman v. 
Dillman, 624 P. 2d 713 (Ut. 1981) further 73 AM. Jur. 2d 
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Statute of Frauds § 405 states that as a prerequisite to 
invoking the doctrine of part performance the party claiming 
such relief must show that unless the oral contract is 
enforced he will be. defrauded. Appellant has made no such 
showing, the evidence shows that Appellant is in no way 
subject to being defrauded. Admittedly Appellant paid to 
Respondent James Jensen $350.00 which Respondent has been 
willing to return to Appellant subject to an appropirate 
interest rate and which Respondent has tendered to the court. 
Appellant has shown no benefit which would accrue to 
Respondents nor any detriment which he would incur without 
the enforcement of the alleged oral contract. 
2. Utah case law has overwhelmingly ruled that the 
terms and conditions of the oral contract sought to be specifically 
enforced must be specific, clear, certain and unambiguous 
and nothing is to be left to the court to supply, and it is 
the responsibility of the party claiming specific performance 
to show that such is the case. Ryan v. Earl, 618 P. 2d 54 
(Ut. 1980), In Re Roth's Estate, 2 U.2d 40, 269 P. 2d 278 
(1954) Montgomery v. Barrett, 40 u. 385, 12 P. 569 (1912) 
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P. 2d 857 (Ut. 1979) to cite a few, 
also 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 401. 
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Again Appellant has failed to carry this burden. In 
fact the record shows that if the parties ever reached any 
agreement conclusive enough to be considered a contract 
that the parties understanding of its terms differ greatly. 
Respondent James Jensen has stated on many occassions that 
Appellant has to perform more than payment i.e. the building 
of a dental clinic on the property and the establishing of 
an Amway business in which Respondent was to participate. 
Since Appellant has failed to clearly establish what the 
terms of any oral contract with Respondent James Jensen were 
he is not entitled to specific performance. 
3. 73 Am. Jur. 2d § 406 supra further states that 
the acts upon which a party bases his claim of part perfor-
mance must be sufficient. The court on many occassions 
has set forth the criteria for evaluating the acts of part 
performance. In Holmgren Brothers Inc. v. Ballard, 534 
P. 2d 611 (Ut. 1975) the court enunciated these criteria, 
J 
improvements must be substantial, valuable or beneficial, 
any consideration given must be of value, possession must be 
actual, open,noncurrent with vendor and with vendors consent 
and any act must be exclusive referable to the contract and 
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in reliance thereon. No clear cut formula has been 
established for determining exactly what vendee must do to 
claim part performance each case must be judged on its own 
facts. In this case the only substantial act done by 
Appellant was the payment by check of $350.00 any other 
act is merely preparatory e.g. surveying, attempting to 
obtain financing, Baugh v. Logan City, 27 U. 2d 291, 495 
P. 2d 814. In no Utah case has partial payment alone been 
sufficient to remove the statute of frauds defense. Only 
by way of dictum in Holmgren Bros. supra has the court ever 
mentioned partial payment alone as sufficient. 73 Am. Jur. 
2d statute of Frauds § 435 states that most jurisdictions 
have held partial payment alone insufficient to satisfy part 
performance. Again Appellant has failed to show acts in 
reliance on the contract sufficent to involve the doctrine 
of part performance. 
The same burden of proof would bar Appellant from 
specific performances on his first claim of sufficient 
memoranda discussed, supra. Even if such a conclusion were 
to be made by this court Appellant has still failed to clearly 
establish what the terms of the contract were to have been. 
- 12 -
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POINT V 
PAROL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS FINDING THAT NO ORAL 
CONTRACT AS SUCH WAS EVER MADE BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES AND THAT IF, ARGUENDO, ANY CONTRACT 
COULD BE IMPLIED, APPELLANT FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE PROVISIONS THEREOF. 
Since this case involves issues of equity i.e. specific 
performance and part performance, the court may review both the 
facts and the conclusions of law. A reading of the two 
transcripts of oral testimony reveals that the parties never 
reached any "meeting of the minds" as to the terms of the 
contemplated contract. Respondent James Jensen has 
repeatedly stated that he considered Appellants building a 
dental clinic on the property and establishing an Amway 
business as provisions of the anticipated agreement. The 
testimony also differs greatly as to who was responsible for 
the breakdown of negotiations. Appellant claims Respondent 
James Jensen in essence did not exercise good faith in proceeding 
to consummate the contract. Respondent James Jensen; however, 
states that Appellant failed to follow through with his 
promise to return and consummate the transaction. Again a 
reading of this testimony indicates that any complete agree-
ment between the parties was to have been reached at sometime 
- 13 -
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after their original negotiations. The trial court held that 
indeed no contract was ever reached between the parties. 
Further the evidence given at trial strongly supports 
the conclusion that even if an oral contract could be 
inferred from the dealings of the parties that the terms 
thereof included more than just payment of money by the 
Appellant. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT FAILED TO DISCHARGE HIS DUTY UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF INQUIRY NOTICE. 
Appellant was on notice and failed to inquire diligently 
as to Respondent Edra Jensen's interest in the property and 
therefore his claim is barred for the simple reason that he had 
no direct negotiation with her and has no signed memoranda 
with which to charge her. In Holmgren, supra the court ruled 
that there is no husband and wife exception to the statute of 
Frauds and that a wife is not bound by the actions of her 
husband. 
Record title is admittedly always been in James Jensen's 
name only: however, the trial court properly held that legal 
title is in Edra Jensen's name by virtue of an unrecorded 
- 14 -
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warranty deed from her husband. The evidence clearly shows 
that Appellant failed to discharge his duty to diligently 
inquire as to Respondent Edra Jensen's interest. Because if 
he had he would have found ample evidence that she indeed 
had an interest. BY checking the records he would have found 
a mortgage listing her as having an interest. Both Respondents 
stated at trial that they have always believed that Edra 
Jensen held some interest in the property. Indeed the party 
who drafted the very deed with which Appellant seeks to charge 
Respondents recognized that Edra held an interest in the 
property and listed her as a granter. Appellant's only 
claim to having discharged his duty of inquiry notice was 
the obtaining of a tax notice which listed James Jensen only. 
However, Appellant admittedly sought such a document for 
the purpose of getting a description of the property and it is 
Respondents contention that any claim to having inquired as 
to Edra's interest, is merely an after thought on his part. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds 
and he has failed to establish a claim under a theory of 
part performance or signed memoranda. Under either 
- 15 -
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doctrine Appellant would-not be entitled to specific perfor-
mance due to the vagueness and ambiguities in the provisions 
and terms contemplated by the parties. parol evidence shows 
that no contract as such was ever reached by the parties. 
Appellant failed to discharge his duty under the doctrine 
of inquiry notice and is barred by virtue of Respondent 
Edra Jensen's interest. 
For these reasons and all others set forth above 
Respondents respectfully request that the judgment of the 
trial court be affirmed. 
I 
.,, 
DATED this -~ day of July, 1982. 
ectfully submitted, 
DALE M. DORIUS 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
P • o . Box "u 11 
29 south Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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